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We analyze bureaucracy and corruption in a market with decentralized exchange and
“lemons.” Exchange is modelled as a sequence of bilateral, random matches. Agents have
private information about the quality of goods they produce and can supplement trade with
socially ineﬃcient bribes. Bureaucracy is modelled as a group of agents similar to private
agents, but who enjoy centralized production and consumption. Transaction patterns be-
tween the bureaucracy and the private sector are fully endogenous. Our main ﬁnding is that
centralized production and consumption in the bureaucracy also gives rise to low power in-
centives for the individual bureaucrats. As a result, we ﬁnd conditions under which private
agents bribe bureaucrats, while they do not bribe each other. An equilibrium with corruption
and an equilibrium without corruption can co-exist. We discuss some welfare implications of
the model.
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The seminal work of Becker (1968) has stimulated a vast literature that analyzes bureaucracy
and corruption as economic phenomena (see Rose-Ackerman, 1999 for references). This literature
models a bureaucracy as a provider of public goods and/or a rent-seeking organization which
controls some aspects of production, distribution, or inspection of goods and services. In this
paper we abstract from any such advantages that might be exogenously given to a bureaucracy.
We also deviate from the literature in the speciﬁcation of a bureaucracy as we do not assume
that it is the sole provider of some goods and services.1 Instead, we model a bureaucracy as a
group of agents with centralized production and consumption of goods, who have access to the
same technologies as the private sector in the production and monitoring of product quality. We
then ask: (i) can bribery and corruption arise? (ii) given the possibility of corruption, can the
bureaucracy improve social welfare despite its lack of any exogenous advantage?
Our analysis starts with an economy without a bureaucracy. Decentralized exchanges are
modelled as a sequence of bilateral, random matches. There is a large number of inﬁnitely-lived
private agents. Each agent can produce either a high-quality storable good that yields no utility
to himself/herself but positive utility to other agents, or a low-quality storable good that yields
no utility to anyone. As in Akerlof (1971), a lemons problem arises since agents do not always
know the quality of other agents’ goods. Upon meeting a trading partner, an agent recognizes the
quality of his partner’s good with some probability. Agents can choose to supplement the trade
of storable goods with services that cost more to produce than the utility of consuming them. We
call such services bribes. A trade occurs only if the two agents both agree to trade the storable
goods, and if they ask for a bribe that is no higher than what the partner oﬀers. We ﬁnd that,
under restrictions on the size of the bribe, private agents in the economy without bureaucracy do
1An exogenously imposed interaction between a bureaucracy and the private sector seems to us to be conducive to
corruption. In addition, an exogenous role of a bureaucracy is not always realistic. For example, a bureaucracy may
provide public housing, rationed goods, or product safety certiﬁcates, but agents can also obtain close substitutes
for these goods and services in the market. We believe that to understand why corruption may arise within a
benevolent bureaucracy, we need a model in which both the role of the bureaucracy and the trading patterns
between a (possibly corrupt) bureaucracy and the private sector are endogenous.
1not bribe each other.
We then introduce a bureaucracy which produces the same set of goods and services as the
private sector. In contrast to private agents, however, bureaucrats produce the storable goods
collectively, and every bureaucrat consumes the same amount of storable goods in each period. In
order to focus on the bureaucrats’ trading (as opposed to production) decisions, we assume that
the bureaucracy always produces high-quality goods. The bureaucracy instructs its members to
follow the following trading rules: (i) to not accept or give bribes, and (ii) to trade with a private
agent if and only if the bureaucrat can recognize the private agent’s storable good as a high
quality good. However, a bureaucrat can choose to deviate from these trading rules. Corruption
is an exchange between a private agent and a bureaucrat in which the private agent oﬀers, and
the bureaucrat accepts, a bribe. Individual bureaucrats’ decisions on whether to accept bribes
aﬀect social welfare, because bribes involve exchange of socially ineﬃcient services. However,
individual bureaucrats ignore such an eﬀect. In this sense the bureaucracy creates an externality.
The monitoring technology is imperfect. The bureaucracy cannot observe the type of match a
bureaucrat was in or the bribe the bureaucrat might have received; instead, the bureaucracy can
observe, with some probability, the quality of the storable good that each bureaucrat accepts in
exchange. When a bureaucrat is found to hold a low-quality good or no good at all, he is expelled
from the bureaucracy forever. We are interested in whether a bureaucracy will be corrupt and if
so, whether a corrupt bureaucracy can be welfare improving.
The following results emerge from our framework. First, there is an equilibrium in which
bureaucrats accept bribes. Because such bribes are not exchanged between private agents, this
demonstrates that bureaucrats are more susceptible to bribery than private agents. It should be
emphasized that this is so not because the bureaucracy has a monopoly in the goods or services
that it oﬀers but, rather, because production and consumption for bureaucrats are centralized.
Since each bureaucrat bears a small fraction of the production cost and consumption depends little
on the bureaucrat’s own trading outcome, it is tempting for a bureaucrat to accept bribes. Thus,
2our main ﬁnding is that while the bureaucracy may create a positive externality which cannot
be easily reproduced by the private sector, this same feature makes bureaucrats susceptible to
bribery since the externality gives rise to a low power incentive scheme.
Second, an equilibrium without corruption can co-exist with an equilibrium with corruption.
We ﬁnd this result interesting for the following reason. It is common to attribute the diﬀerent
levels of corruption among countries to diﬀerent monitoring technologies and punishment schemes.
Our model suggests that two economies that have the same fundamentals may have very diﬀerent
levels of corruption since corruption deterrence depends on beliefs as well as on fundamentals. If
agents believe that bureaucrats accept bribes, the bureaucracy is ineﬃcient, and so the loss from
being expelled from the bureaucracy is small. In this case, bureaucrats indeed accept bribes.
However, if agents believe that bureaucrats do not accept bribes, the bureaucracy is eﬃcient,
and the beneﬁt from belonging to the bureaucracy is large enough to deter corruption. The two
equilibria diﬀer in welfare and the size of the bureaucracy. The equilibrium without corruption
Pareto dominates the equilibrium with corruption, thus, corruption reduces welfare.2
Third, when the bureaucracy is small and agents are patient, an increase in the size of the
bureaucracy increases the welfare of both private agents and bureaucrats. Thus, if a bureaucracy
can commit to producing only high-quality goods, an economy with a corrupt bureaucracy can still
be better oﬀ than an economy without a bureaucracy. As the size of the bureaucracy increases,
the public provision of high-quality goods crowds out private provision, but not one for one.
The total supply of high-quality goods in the economy increases, leading to higher welfare. In
addition, centralized production and consumption can make bureaucrats more inﬂexible in trade;
for example, they ﬁnd it easier to refuse to trade when a private agent’s good is of unknown
quality. This inﬂexibility improves welfare by reducing the number of lemons in the economy.
Finally, in the presence of corruption, an improvement in the ability to recognize the quality
of goods does not necessarily improve welfare, due to the eﬀect on the size of the bureaucracy.
2Interestingly, although corruption does speed up exchange, it speeds up only socially ineﬃcient exchange, thus
encouraging the production of lemons. This is in contrast to Lui (1985).
3Because the improved ability enables the bureaucracy to catch and expel corrupt bureaucrats
with a higher probability, the bureaucracy becomes smaller in a stationary equilibrium, which
leads to a lower total supply of high-quality goods and hence lower welfare. For an improvement
in the monitoring technology to increase welfare, either the economy must be in an equilibrium
without corruption, or the improvement must be suﬃciently large.
The literature on corruption is too voluminous to be surveyed here; we refer to Rose-Ackerman
(1999) for references. Some features or results of our model exist in the literature. For example,
the role of market failure is emphasized by Rose-Ackerman (1978) and Lui (1985) in a queuing
model and by Cadot (1987) in a model with asymmetric information. Also, multiple equilibria
exist when the level of punishment on corruption is endogenous (Lui, 1986, and Cadot, 1987),
or when the returns to rent-seeking activities do not dissipate as quickly as those to regular
production activities (Murphy et al., 1993). In contrast to these models, our paper develops
a search-theoretic foundation for corrupt exchanges by determining the exchange patterns en-
dogenously. This allows us to demonstrate clearly how corruption arises from the same frictions
that make the Walrasian market unattainable, without resorting to the assumption that the bu-
reaucracy controls the production, distribution, or inspection of certain goods/services. Another
advantage of our model is that it permits a coherent welfare analysis because it takes into account
how the exchange patterns may respond to policies.3
As an illustration of these diﬀerences, we contrast the welfare role of a bureaucracy in our
paper with that in Acemoglu and Verdier (2000). Assuming that the bureaucracy controls the
inspection of project quality, Acemoglu and Verdier show that the bureaucracy can increase
welfare by forcing private agents to adopt high-quality projects. In our model, the bureaucracy
does not have such capacity; instead, it aﬀects private agents’ behavior only indirectly through
its non-negligible size in the market. To put it diﬀerently, the bureaucrats in our model improve
3The welfare analyses in existing models are subject to the following version of the Lucas critique. The bu-
reaucracy’s policies may change transaction patterns and/or the extent to which the bureaucracy controls certain
elements of the economy. In this sense, assuming that these elements are ﬁxed makes policy evaluation unreliable.
A model in which transaction patterns are meaningful and endogenous provides a ﬁrst step towards addressing this
criticism. The search model used in this paper oﬀers such a setup.
4welfare by cleaning up their own act rather than forcing private agents to clean up theirs as in
Acemoglu and Verdier’s model.
To model decentralized exchange, we draw from the search monetary theory pioneered by
Kiyotaki and Wright (1989). In this sense, the economy without a bureaucracy generalizes the
work of Williamson and Wright (1994) and Wang (2000), who introduce the lemons problem into
search monetary models but do not allow for bribery. While these authors proceed to study how
money can reduce the severity of the lemons problem, we retain the non-monetary economy and
study the role of a bureaucracy. Our approach of modelling bribery as an exchange of socially
ineﬃcient services follows from Engineer and Shi (1998). Finally, we model a bureaucracy as a
non-negligible group of agents who have centralized consumption and production as in Li and
Wright (1998). Li and Wright assume that the government agents always follow the government’s
trading rules. We abandon this assumption in order to analyze corruption.
Before describing the model, we wish to emphasize the following point. In what follows, the
bureaucracy should be interpreted as a benevolent government organization and not as a large
private coalition of agents. Given that the bureaucracy in our model does not control any aspect
of the economy, and it produces the same goods/services that the private sector does, one may
be tempted to interpret it as a large private ﬁrm (possibly a monopoly) and argue that such
a ﬁrm can improve social welfare by internalizing the externality which we associate with the
bureaucracy. Our model does not lead to this interpretation. In particular, the production and
trading rules that our bureaucracy follows are aimed to improve social welfare, rather than to
maximize private proﬁts. While a benevolent government will ﬁnd it optimal to adopt these
rules, the rules are in general not the best responses of a private ﬁrm that maximizes its own
present value. Thus, a bureaucracy that adopts such rules could not easily be interpreted as a
private ﬁrm. We do not take a stand on the issue of whether any bureaucracy is truly benevolent
in reality. We believe that it is interesting to study why corruption can exist in a benevolent
bureaucracy and whether such a bureaucracy can improve welfare. This focus also explains why
5we assume that the bureaucracy always produces high-quality goods.
2. An Economy without Bureaucracy
In this section we describe an economy without a bureaucracy and show that no trade involves
the use of ineﬃcient services (bribes), provided that some restrictions on the size of the bribe are
satisﬁed. This paves the way for an analysis of an economy with a bureaucracy, which appears
in Sections 3 and 4.
2.1. The Environment
Time is discrete. There is no public record-keeping, so there is no credit or any other contractual
arrangement. Agents live forever and discount the future with a discount factor β ∈ (0,1). Each
agent can produce a perfectly storable and indivisible good, which has no consumption value for
the agent himself, but can yield utility to other agents. The good can be either of high quality
(H)o rl o wq u a l i t y( L, lemons). Producing a high-quality good costs c>0 in utility and yields
utility u>cto the consumer. Producing a low-quality good costs nothing and yields no utility.
The two agents in a match may not both have high-quality goods. Thus, the lack of double
coincidence of wants arises not from the mismatch of the physical types of the goods, as in a
search/money model, but rather from the diﬀerential quality of goods. The quality of a good is
private information. With probability α ∈ (0,1), nature determines whether an agent can discern
the quality of his trading partner’s good.
Each agent can also produce non-storable services, which can be consumed by all agents.
Unlike the storable goods, services are socially ineﬃcient to produce: the utility to a consumer of
each unit of service is 1 but the unit cost of providing such services is b>1. Thus, an agent will
never produce services for himself. We refer to the exchange of services as “bribery.” To simplify
the analysis, we restrict attention to the case where the amount of bribes is either 0 or B>0.4
4If services are divisible, the set of equilibria is much larger, but this does not add additional insights for the
main issues studied here. Similarly, the cost function of service production can be extended to b(q), with b
0(0) > 1
and b
00 > 0, as in Engineer and Shi (1998), who study a monetary model without private information regarding
goods’ quality.
6Furthermore, we impose the following assumption.
Assumption 1. A1. B is bounded above so that a producer of a low-quality good is willing to
oﬀer a bribe:
B<u / b ;( 2 . 1 )
A2. B is suﬃciently large so that a producer of a high-quality good is unwilling to oﬀer a bribe




;( 2 . 2 )





Next, we describe the exchange process. At the beginning of a period, each agent who does
not hold a storable good decides the quality of good he produces. After production, agents are
randomly matched in pairs and nature determines, with probability α, whether an agent observes
the quality of the partner’s good. The realization of this random event is private information, so
an agent does not know whether his partner recognizes the quality of his good. The two agents
then simultaneously announce three decisions: whether to trade the storable good, the quantity
of services proposed to give to the partner, and the quantity of services to ask from the partner.
A trade occurs between the two agents if and only if both choose to trade the storable good, and
the quantity of services asked by each agent does not exceed the quantity oﬀered by his partner.
If a trade takes place, the two agents immediately produce, swap the durable goods, and give the
quantity of services requested by the partner. They then consume and depart. If a trade does
not take place, the two agents depart immediately. This trading mechanism keeps the analysis
tractable and is imposed on the basis of its simplicity.5
An agent’s trading decision depends on two types of information. One is the quality of his own
storable good, denoted by a subscript i ∈ {H,L}. The other is the knowledge of the partner’s
5In particular, we do not allow agents to re-bid. The latter mechanism, albeit realistic, would generate a large
set of equilibria, while it is not clear how it would contribute to the main issues studied here. Sequential bargaining
causes similar complexity because of the two-sided asymmetric information.
7good determined by nature, denoted by a second subscript j ∈ {H,L,U}. The meanings of j = H
and j = L are clear, while the case j = U (“uninformed”) refers to the situation where nature did
not reveal the quality of the partner’s good to the agent. We refer to an agent with information
(i,j)a sa g e n t( i,j). The agent makes three trading decisions. The ﬁrst is whether to trade the
storable good, denoted by sij ∈ {T,NT},w h e r eT means “trade” and NT “no-trade”. We allow
for mixed strategies and denote xij =P r ( sij = T). The second trading decision is the quantity
of services that the agent asks the partner to provide, denoted by qa
ij. The third decision is the
quantity of services that the agent proposes to give, denoted by q
g
ij. Thus, the trading decisions
by an agent with information (i,j)a r e( xij,q
g
ij,qa
ij). The trading decisions of an arbitrary agent
are denoted by (Xij,Q
g
ij,Q a
ij), where Xij =P r ( Sij = T).6




















The trade takes place with probability xijδ
i0j0
ij Xi0j0. The notation corresponding to δ for an
arbitrary agent is ∆. As mentioned earlier, if trade takes place, the quantities of services traded
are the asked quantities, qa
ij and Qa
i0j0.
An agent’s production decision is denoted by p ∈ [0,1], which is the probability of the agent
producing a high-quality good. The production decision of other agents is denoted by P.E a c h
agent chooses (p,x,qg,qa) taking other agents’ decisions (P,X,Qg,Q a) as given. We will focus
on stationary, symmetric equilibria, those in which the choices are stationary and agents of the
same type make the same choices.
2.2. Value Functions
Let Vi be the value function of an agent holding storable good i,w h e r ei ∈ {H,L} before matching
takes place. The value function before the production decision is V0. The production decision p
6Throughout the paper, most capital-case variables are per-capita or aggregate variables that individual agents
take as given.
8solves the following problem:
V0 =m a x
p∈[0,1]






=1 , if VH − c>V L;
=0 , if VH − c<V L;
∈ [0,1], if VH − c = VL.
(2.5)
The value function VH and the exchange decisions (xHj,q
g
Hj,qa
Hj)j∈{H,L,U} are given by:
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The left-hand side of the above equation represents the gain from participating in the current
exchange relative to holding onto the good until the next period. The three terms on the right-
hand side specify expected gains from possible trades. There are three cases: (i) when the agent
recognizes that his partner holds a high-quality good; (ii) when he recognizes that his partner
holds a low-quality good; and (iii) when he does not recognize the quality of his partner’s good.
In the last case, the agent rationally believes that his partner holds a high-quality good with
probability P, and a low-quality good with probability 1 − P.
We explain the ﬁrst case in detail next, and the other cases are similar. With probability αP
the agent meets a partner with a high-quality good and recognizes the quality. The expected gain
from trade in this case, speciﬁed by terms in the ﬁrst bracket, arises in two situations. The ﬁrst
is when the partner also recognizes the quality of the agent’s good, in which case the probability
of trade is XHHδHH
HH. Trading in this situation gives the agent utility u from consuming the
partner’s storable good, utility qa
HH from consuming the partner’s services, and an opportunity
to produce in the next period (which has a present value βV0) .T h ec o s to ft r a d i n gc o m e sf r o m
9the disutility of producing services, bQa
HH, as well as the foregone value of the object, βVH.T h e
second situation is when the partner does not recognize the quality of the agent’s good. The
expected gain from trade can be explained similarly. Notice that in both situations the agent’s
trade decisions must be the same because the agent does not know which situation he is in. The
value function VL and the exchange decisions (xLj,q
g
Lj,qa
Lj)j∈{H,L,U} can be described similarly.
2.3. Equilibria
Agents’ beliefs must be consistent with their strategies. If an agent believes that everyone else in
the economy produces only high(low)-quality goods, then it is rational for the agent to treat a
good of unknown quality as a high(low)-quality good. Thus, for all i ∈ {H,L},



















ij), and the representative agent’s strategies (P,Xij,Q a
ij,Q
g
ij), (i ∈ {H,L}, j ∈
{H,L,U}), such that (i) for given value functions and strategies for the representative agent,
each individual agent’s production strategy solves the maximization problem in (2.4), and the
trading strategies solve their maximization problems; (ii) agents’ trading strategies satisfy the
consistency requirements in (2.7); and (iii) strategies are symmetric; i.e., individuals’ strategies
are the same as the representative agent’s strategies.
We focus on equilibria that have the following properties. First, there is a positive measure
of high-quality goods in the market, i.e., where P>0( I fP = 0, autarky is at least as good as
any equilibrium with exchange). Second, some low-quality goods are exchanged for high-quality
goods (i.e., XHU > 0), since the informational asymmetry in this case generates a clear welfare
cost. Finally, when the quality of the partner’s good is unknown or observed to be of low quality,
an agent trades only if he obtains a strictly positive surplus. This restriction, which can be
rationalized by the existence of an arbitrarily small transaction cost, rules out spurious trading
where two low-quality good holders swap their goods.
10T h e r ea r et h r e ep o s s i b l et y p e so fs y m m e t r i ce q u ilibria. In all equilibria, an agent does not
trade with another agent whose quality he observes to be low. Also, two agents always trade if
both observe that their partner holds a high-quality good. The three types of equilibria diﬀer
in the values of P and XHU.I nt h eﬁrst type, which we term a type a equilibrium, every agent
produces a high-quality good with probability 1 and always trades even when he does not discern
the quality of his partner’s good. That is, P = XHU = 1. In the second type of equilibrium,
termed a type b equilibrium, P<1=XHU. In this equilibrium, even though a high-quality good
holder does not discern the partner’s quality and knows that there is positive probability that
the partner’s good is a lemon, he trades anyway. The third type of equilibrium, termed a type c
equilibrium,h a sP<1a n dXHU < 1.
Proposition 2.1. There exists a type a (P =1 ) equilibrium if and only if α >c / u .I n t h i s
equilibrium, agents do not request or oﬀer bribes, and they trade with probability one.
The proof appears in Appendix A. Intuitively, agents always produce only H and always
trade with each other when it is easy to discern the quality of goods, in the sense that α >c / u .
Because anyone who deviates to produce a lemon will be caught with high probability and denied
trade, a deviation is not proﬁtable.
Since the lemons problem is not severe in a type a equilibrium, we shift our attention to other
types of equilibria. In a type b or a type c equilibrium, 0 <P<1a n ds oV0 = VL = VH −c.T h e
following proposition characterizes these equilibria. The proof appears in Appendix B.
Proposition 2.2. Equilibria with 0 <P<1 and VL > 0 involve no bribe exchange. An agent
with an L good always wants to trade. An agent with an H good trades if he discerns the
partner’s good as H; he does not trade if he discerns the partner’s good as L; and he trades with
a positive probability XHU if he cannot discern the quality of the partner’s good. In the last
situation, XHU =1in a type b equilibrium, while XHU < 1 in a type c equilibrium. A type b
equilibrium exists if and only if c/u < α < α2 ≡ u/[β(2u − βc)].At y p ec equilibrium exists if






















The above proposition, together with Proposition 2.1, illustrates two main features of the
equilibria in our model. First, no bribe is exchanged in any equilibrium without a bureaucracy.
The precise proof of this result is involved, as shown in Appendix B, but an informal argument is
straightforward. First, an agent who holds a high-quality good will not trade if he discerns that
the partner holds a low-quality good, even if his partner oﬀers a bribe. The surplus from trading
away a high-quality good for a lemon plus a bribe is B − β(VH − V0) and, because VH − V0 = c
in all equilibria with P ∈ (0,1), this surplus is negative under (2.1) and (2.3). Second, an agent
who holds a high-quality good will not oﬀer a bribe, regardless of his knowledge of the partner’s
good. Even if the partner’s good is observed to be of high quality, oﬀering a bribe yields the
agent a surplus no more than u−bB −βc, which is negative under (2.2). Thus, only agents who
hold low-quality goods may oﬀer bribes. Third, a high-quality good holder does not ask for a
bribe if he cannot discern the quality of his partner’s good. In such a match, a high-quality good
holder trades away the storable good with positive probability, hoping that the partner holds a
high-quality good as well. But if the partner indeed holds a high-quality good, requesting a bribe
is not optimal as it will surely result in no trade since a high-quality good partner never oﬀers
a bribe. Thus, a high-quality good holder never requests a bribe. Similarly, if an agent with a
low-quality good wants to trade in a match with an agent who holds a high- or unknown-quality
good, the agent should never ask for a bribe. Thus, no trade involves the exchange of bribes.
Another implication of the model is that diﬀerent equilibria can co-exist. For example, when-
ever a type b equilibrium exists, a type a equilibrium exists as well. Which one of these two
equilibria occurs depends on the agents’ beliefs about other agents’ production decisions, and
these beliefs are self-fulﬁlling. If a producer believes that other agents will produce high-quality
goods, then it is optimal for him to produce a high-quality good since producing a low-quality
good would signiﬁcantly reduce his trading opportunities. But if a producer believes that other
12agents will produce high-quality goods with a probability strictly less than 1, then it is optimal
for him to do the same since always producing a high-quality good would incur a high production
cost which would be wasted in trade with partners who hold (unknown) low-quality goods.7
In a type c equilibrium, the value functions and XHU are as follows:
(1 − β)VH = P[α +( 1− α)XHU]2(u − βc) − (1 − α)βcXHU(1 − P),














In the remainder of this paper, we will restrict our attention to the parameter region α ∈
(0,c/u). This serves two purposes, in addition to simplifying the analysis of a bureaucracy. First,
the restriction captures the severe information asymmetry which is the type of market failure
we wish to focus on. Second, the restriction will facilitate the comparison between an economy
with a bureaucracy and the economy without. Under this restriction, the type c equilibrium is
the only possible equilibrium in the economy without a bureaucracy, but there can be multiple
equilibria in an economy with a bureaucracy. Thus, we can attribute the multiplicity exclusively
to the distinct features of the bureaucracy.
3. A Bureaucracy of Exogenous Size
In this section, we introduce a bureaucracy but keep the size of the bureaucracy and the level of
punishment on corruption exogenous. We demonstrate that bribery can exist in an economy with
a bureaucracy and study how the level of corruption depends on the size of the punishment. This
is a preliminary step toward Section 4, in which we endogenize both the size of the bureaucracy
and the level of punishment.
Here, the population consists of two groups, private agents and bureaucrats. The mass of
bureaucrats is γ ∈ (0,1) and that of private agents is 1 − γ. Private agents are as described in
7Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 show that the results in Williamson and Wright (1994, section III) are robust to the
possibility of bribery, provided that the size of bribes satisﬁes Assumption 1.
13the previous section, and each behaves according to his own incentives. In contrast, bureaucrats
have the following two distinct characteristics:
• The bureaucracy centralizes production and consumption of storable goods. All bureaucrats
jointly produce high-quality goods at the beginning of each period and allocate one unit to
each member who has traded the storable good away in the previous period. No bureaucrat
alone can produce storable goods although he is able to produce services. We assume that
the bureaucracy can produce only high-quality goods. With regards to consumption, all
bureaucrats pool their holdings from exchange at the end of the period, and every bureaucrat
consumes the same amount regardless of whether he succeeded in trade.8
• The bureaucracy prescribes the following trading instructions for its members: (i) to not
accept bribes, and (ii) to trade if and only if their trading partner is known to hold a high-
quality good. A bureaucrat can deviate from these trading instructions. If he does so and
is caught, he is punished with an exogenous loss of utility R>0 but is allowed to stay in
the bureaucracy (in Section 4, such a defector is expelled from the bureaucracy).
Centralized production and consumption captures an important aspect of actual bureaucra-
cies. That is, the beneﬁt of belonging to the bureaucracy derives not so much from individual
bureaucrats’ actions alone but rather from all bureaucrats’ actions together. This feature cuts
both ways in a bureaucrat’s decision on whether to deviate from the bureaucracy’s trading instruc-
tions. On the one hand, centralized consumption generates the inﬂexibility typically associated
with a bureaucracy, which increases eﬃciency. Because a bureaucrat receives the same level of
consumption of storable goods regardless of whether he succeeds in trade, he may refuse to trade
for an unknown quality good. On the other hand, bribes may entice a bureaucrat to trade the
good away because an individual bureaucrat bears little of the production cost. This is a novel
implication of our model that we believe also captures a main aspect of some bureaucracies. The
8More precisely, the bureaucracy uses a lottery to allocate the goods received from the exchange to the bu-
reaucrats. Every bureaucrat has the same probability of winning one unit of the good regardless of whether he
succeeded in trade in that period.
14bureaucracy creates a positive externality which cannot be easily reproduced by the private sec-
tor, but which, at the same time, makes bureaucrats susceptible to bribery due to a low power
incentive scheme.
The assumption that the bureaucracy produces only high-quality goods may not be realistic.
Similarly, a bureaucracy in reality may not adopt the trading instructions speciﬁed above. We
make these assumptions because we try to analyze the behavior of a benevolent bureaucracy.
These production and trading rules maximize social welfare and, hence, can be thought of as the
optimal policies of a benevolent bureaucracy. We emphasize, however, that they are typically
not the best responses of a private ﬁrm that maximizes its present value: under the maintained
restriction that α <c / u ,ap r i v a t eﬁrm will choose P<1 instead and will trade with a positive
probability when the trading partner’s good is of unknown quality. Therefore, the bureaucracy
in our model ﬁts the description of a government bureaucracy and not that of a private ﬁrm.
To complete the description of the bureaucracy, we need to describe how it enforces its trading
instructions. The enforcement technology is imperfect. The bureaucracy cannot directly observe
the type of the match or the bribe that each bureaucrat might have received; instead, it can only
observe the quality of a bureaucrat’s storable good with probability α. Thus, we assume that the
bureaucracy’s detection technology is the same as the private sector’s. A bureaucrat is punished
only if the bureaucracy ﬁnds that he holds a low-quality good, or that he holds no good at all.
To simplify the analysis, we make three additional assumptions. First, bureaucrats must
pool the storable goods received from the exchange before consuming them. This rules out
embezzlement. Second, each bureaucrat faces the same matching rate as a private agent does.
Third, when two bureaucrats meet, they simply swap their inventories and, after swapping, the
goods become consumption goods. The last two assumptions ensure that a bureaucrat is not at
a disadvantage in the number of possible trades relative to a private agent.
To analyze agents’ decisions, let us use a subscript G to denote variables related to a bu-
reaucrat. An individual bureaucrat’s decisions are (yGj,q
g
Gj,qa
Gj)j=H,L,U,w h e r eyGj denotes the
15probability with which a bureaucrat agrees to exchange the storable good with a private agent
w h oh o l d sat y p ej good, and (q
g
Gj,qa
Gj) denote the corresponding quantities of services oﬀered
and requested. Let δiG
Gj indicate whether the quantities of services by the bureaucrat and the
private agent are consistent with each other (δ =1 ) ,o rn o t( δ = 0), where i ∈ {H,L} and
j ∈ {H,L,U}. Let a representative bureaucrat’s decisions be (YGj,Q
g
Gj,Q a
Gj)j=H,L,U,a n dt h e
corresponding indicator function be ∆iG
Gj. Similarly, for a private agent in a match with a bu-
reaucrat, the decisions are (xiG,q
g
iG,qa
iG), where i = H,L, and the corresponding decisions by a




As discussed before, we restrict α <c / uso as to focus on equilibria with 0 <P<1a n d
0 <X HU < 1. Then V0 = VL = VH − c. The exchanges between two private agents are the
same as described in Proposition 2.2. Adapting (2.8) to take into account the exchanges with
bureaucrats, we have the following value functions for private agents:
































Notice that we have already imposed the consistency requirement that if a private agent meets a
bureaucrat and cannot recognize the quality of the bureaucrat’s good, he must rationally believe
that the quality is high (since bureaucrats can only produce high-quality goods).
Every bureaucrat obtains net expected utility uG from consuming storable goods in each
period. This is equal to the total utility from consuming high-quality goods minus the total
production cost in the bureaucracy, divided by the size of the bureaucracy. That is,
uG = u
n
γ +( 1− γ)[αPYGHXHG∆HG





1 − (1 − γ)
"
1 − αPYGHXHG∆HG
GH − α(1 − P)YGLXLG∆LG
GL
−(1 − α)YGU(PXHG∆HG




The ﬁrst bracket in the above expression gives the average rate at which a bureaucrat receives a
high-quality good from exchange. Notice that the bureaucrat always exchanges for a high-quality
16good with another bureaucrat. The second bracket gives the average rate at which a bureaucrat
needs to be re-supplied with a high-quality good. The only case in which a bureaucrat does not
need to be supplied is when he meets a private agent and does not trade. The probability for this
event is given by the terms in the large squared brackets. The value function for a bureaucrat,
VG,i sa sf o l l o w s :





























A notable feature of this value function is that a bureaucrat’s trading decision is driven by bribes.
The utility (uG) from consuming the storable goods does not aﬀect directly a bureaucrat’s decision
on whether to accept a bribe. The expected punishment is given by the product of the detection
probability, α, and the level of punishment, R. Notice that it is impossible to detect bribery
when a bureaucrat exchanges for a high-quality good. We impose a tie-breaking restriction that
the bureaucrat exchanges with probability 1 if the partner holds a known high-quality good and
the surplus from bribes is zero.
Having speciﬁed the general forms of the value functions, we now turn to the study of equi-
libria. Again, we examine only symmetric equilibria where agents with the same type and infor-
mation choose the same strategies. Not surprisingly, the bureaucracy’s trading instructions are
consistent with equilibrium if expected punishment to corruption exceeds the beneﬁto fb r i b e r y ,
i.e., if αR>B . The following proposition veriﬁes this intuition (see Appendix C for a proof):
Proposition 3.1. If αR>B , no bribes are exchanged in equilibrium. Trades between private
agents are as described in Proposition 2.2. A private agent and a bureaucrat trade if and only
if the private agent holds a high-quality good, and the bureaucrat recognizes the quality of the
private agent’s good.
If the punishment on corruption is not severe enough, however, bribery will occur in certain
matches. We assert this result in the following proposition, which is proved in Appendix D.
17Proposition 3.2. If R is suﬃciently close to zero, then the following trading strategies form
an equilibrium. Trades between private agents are as described in Proposition 2.2. In a match
between two bureaucrats, the two swap the storable goods. In a match between a bureaucrat and
a private agent, trade occurs except when the private agent’s good is of high-quality but is not
recognized by the bureaucrat. Moreover, bribery occurs if and only if the private agent holds a
low-quality good. Speciﬁcally, the trading decisions are as follows:
Qa
GL = Qa












LG = B, Q
g
HG =0 ; ( 3 . 2 )
YGL = YGU = YGH =1 ,X HG = XLG =1 , (3.3)
∆GU
HG = ∆HG
GU =0 , ∆HG
GH = ∆GH
HG =1 , ∆
Gj
LG = ∆LG
Gj =1(j = L,U). (3.4)
Eq. (3.1) states that the bureaucrat requests a bribe whenever he is not sure whether the
partner’s good is of high quality, but a bureaucrat never oﬀers a bribe. Eq. (3.2) states that the
private agent never requests a bribe from a bureaucrat, and that he oﬀers a bribe only when he
holds a low-quality good. Eq. (3.3) states that the two agents always decide to trade their storable
goods. However, a trade does not always occur because the quantities of services proposed by
the two agents may be inconsistent. This happens when the private agent holds a high-quality
good, and the bureaucrat does not observe it, as indicated by (3.4).
In light of Proposition 3.2, we can re-examine two views expressed in the literature. First,
bribes are sometimes deemed “natural” because they are similar to gifts between private agents
(Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Under our parameter restrictions, there is a clear distinction between
bribes and gifts: private agents oﬀer ineﬃcient services as bribes to bureaucrats which they do
not oﬀer to other private agents or receive from bureaucrats. Second, it is sometimes said that
bribery improves social welfare because it can speed up exchange. Although it is true in our
model that an equilibrium with bribery has more trades than in an equilibrium without bribery,
it is the socially ineﬃcient exchange that bribery speeds up. This is because only the producers
18of lemons are willing to bribe, so corruption encourages the production and exchange of lemons
and socially ineﬃcient services. As a result, corruption unambiguously reduces welfare.
Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 point to the possibility of multiple equilibria, since they suggest
that bribery and corruption are more likely to arise when the punishment on corruption is lower.
Because the punishment on corruption in reality often depends on whether there is corruption, it
is possible that multiple equilibria can be self-fulﬁlling when the punishment is endogenous. In
the next section we examine this issue and analyze welfare.
4. Endogenous Size of Bureaucracy and Punishment on Corruption
In this section we assume that a bureaucrat who is caught accepting bribes is expelled from the
bureaucracy. In this event the bureaucrat loses the current utility, uG, plus the future beneﬁt
from belonging to the bureaucracy. That is, the punishment is now endogenously determined as
R = uG + β(VG − V0).
The size of the bureaucracy is also endogenous in any equilibrium with corruption because
corrupt bureaucrats exit from the bureaucracy once they are caught. In order to obtain a sta-
tionary size of the bureaucracy, we introduce exogenous deaths and births. Each agent dies with
probability θ at the end of each period, and a measure θ of new agents are born at the begin-
ning of each period. A fraction σ of the newborns are bureaucrats, and the remaining 1 − σ are
private agents. If the size of the bureaucracy is γ in this period, the size in the next period is
γ0 =( 1−θ)(γ−m)+θσ,w h e r em is the endogenous mass of corrupt bureaucrats who are expelled
as a result of being caught accepting bribes. In a steady state, γ0 = γ,a n ds oγ = σ−(1−θ)m/θ,
which is positive iﬀ m<θσ/(1−θ). Given the probability of death, the eﬀective discount factor
is β =( 1−θ)e β,w h e r ee β now stands for the discount factor used previously. All the Bellman equa-
tions in the previous section are valid after re-interpreting the discount factor as β =( 1− θ)e β.
Again we restrict attention to the case where 0 <X HU < 1a n d0<P<1. In this case,
V0 = VL = VH − c.
194.1. An Equilibrium with Corruption
In this equilibrium, agents’ decisions are as described by Proposition 3.2. Substituting (3.1)—(3.4)
and R = uG + β(VG − VL) into the value functions in the last section, we have:
(1 − β)VH = α(1 − γ)(1 − P)βc + γα(u − βc),
(1 − β)VL =( 1− γ)(1 − α)uPXHU + γ(u − bB),
(1 − β)VG = uG +( 1− γ)(1 − P){B − α[uG + β(VG − VL)]},
uG =( u − c)[γ +( 1− γ)α] − (1 − γ)(1 − P)[αu +( 1− α)c].
The probability XHU is given by (2.9). Solving VH − VL = c,w eh a v e :
P =1−
α(u − γβc) − (1 − β)c − γ(u − bB)
(1 − γ)[α(u − βc)+uβc/(u − βc)]
. (4.1)
Notice that the size of the bureaucracy and the level of corruption, as measured by the fraction
of bureaucrats accepting bribes, aﬀect private agents’ production decisions in equilibrium. This
inﬂuence comes from the non-negligible role of the bureaucracy in the market.
The equilibrium with corruption imposes three restrictions. First, a bureaucrat must have no
incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategy. That is, a bureaucrat gains nothing by not
accepting bribes when the quality of the private agent’s good is known to be low or is unknown.
The conditions for these two types of matches are the same, and so we consider only the case
where a bureaucrat discerns the private agent’s good to be of low quality. Suppose that the
bureaucrat refuses to accept bribes in this case. His value function, denoted by V d
G,s a t i s ﬁes
(1 − β)V d
G = uG +( 1− γ)(1 − α)(1 − P){B − α[uG + β(VG − VL)]}.
Comparing this value V d
G with the equilibrium value VG, it is evident that the deviation is not
proﬁtable if and only if B>α[uG + β(VG − VL)]. Substituting (VG,V L,u G,P,X HU), we can
express this condition explicitly as follows:
(1 − β)B/α + βγ(u − bB)












20Second, this equilibrium requires that XHU,P ∈ (0,1). The restrictions 0 <X HU < 1, which
imply 0 <P<1, are equivalent to:
(1 − β)c + γ(u − bB − βc)+
√
∆1
2[γ(u − βc)+( 1− γ)βc]
< α <
u[(1 − γβ)c + γ(u − bB)]
γ(u − βc)2 + βc[(2 − γ)u − βc]
, (4.3)
where
∆1 ≡ [(1 − β)c + γ(u − bB − βc)]2
+
4βc
u−βc[(1 − β)c + γ(u − bB)][γ(u − βc)+( 1− γ)βc].
Third, the mass of bureaucrats must be stationary; i.e., γ = σ − (1 − θ)m/θ.T h e m a s s o f
corrupt bureaucrats who are caught and, thus, expelled in each period is m = γ(1−γ)(1−P)α,
where (1−γ)(1−P) is the probability with which a bureaucrat accepts a bribe and α the detection
probability. Then, the stationary size of the bureaucracy satisﬁes:
γ[θ + α(1 − θ)(1 − γ)(1 − P)] − θσ =0 . (4.4)
Clearly, 0 < γ < σ. Substituting P from (4.1), we can write the above equation as a quadratic
equation of γ and show that there is a unique admissible solution for γ if
σ <
αu − (1 − β)c
u − bB + αβc
. (4.5)
Moreover, the solution for γ approaches 0 when either σ approaches 0 or θ approaches 1.9 Because
the bureaucrats’ choice of accepting bribes aﬀects the private sector’s production decision, P,i t
also aﬀects the stationary size of the bureaucracy.
An equilibrium with corruption exists if (4.2), (4.3), and (4.4) hold, together with (2.1) —
(2.3). We delay the study of the existence issue until subsection 4.3.
4.2. An Equilibrium without Corruption
In this equilibrium, agents’ trade decisions are described by Proposition 3.1. Since no bribery
occurs, no agent exits the bureaucracy, and so the stationary size of the bureaucracy is γ = σ.
9To show these properties, substitute P from (4.1) to write (4.4) as




















Under (4.5), the above quadratic function is positive when γ =0a n di sn e g a t i v ew h e nγ = σ.
21The value functions are as follows:
(1 − β)VH = α(1 − σ)(1 − P)βc + σα(u − βc),
(1 − β)VL =( 1− σ)(1 − α)uPXHU,
(1 − β)VG = uG =( u − c)[σ +( 1− σ)αP],
where XHU is given by (2.9), and P is given by
P =1−
α(u − σβc) − (1 − β)c
(1 − σ)[α(u − βc)+uβc/(u − βc)]
. (4.6)
For an equilibrium without corruption to exist, a bureaucrat must have no incentive to de-
viate from the equilibrium strategy of not accepting bribes. The required condition is B<
α[uG + β(VG − VL)]. Although this condition appears to simply reverse the earlier inequality
that was required to induce a bureaucrat to accept bribes, the implied restriction on the para-
m e t e r si sq u i t ed i ﬀerent. This is because the variables (uG,V G,V L) now have diﬀerent values. To
see this distinction clearly, substitute (uG,V G,V L) in the equilibrium without bribery. We can
express the no-deviation condition as follows:












This is diﬀerent from the corresponding condition in the equilibrium with bribery, (4.2).
In addition, the equilibrium requires that XHU,P ∈ (0,1). These are equivalent to
(1 − β − σβ)c +
√
∆2
2[σ(u − βc)+( 1− σ)βc]
< α <
(1 − σβ)cu
σ(u − βc)2 + βc[(2 − σ)u − βc]
, (4.8)
where
∆2 ≡ (1 − β − σβ)2c2 +
4(1 − β)βc2
u − βc
[σ(u − βc)+( 1− σ)βc].
An equilibrium without corruption exists if (4.7), (4.8), and (2.1) — (2.3) hold.
224.3. Existence and Co-existence of Equilibria
We ﬁrst establish the existence and co-existence of the two equilibria analytically for special cases.
Then we numerically illustrate the existence in a broader parameter region.
Proposition 4.1. If β → 0, no equilibrium with trade exists. If β is suﬃciently close to 1,a n d
σ is suﬃciently close to 0, an equilibrium with XHU,P ∈ (0,1) exists in a non-empty parameter
region that satisﬁes 0 < α <u / (2u − c) and (2.1) — (2.3). Moreover, the equilibrium with
corruption and the equilibrium without corruption co-exist.
Proof.I fβ → 0, (2.9) implies XHU < 0, and so there is no equilibrium. For the rest of the
proposition, set (β,σ) → (1,0) so that γ → 0. The conditions for XHU ∈ (0,1) then become
0 < α <u / (2u − c) in both equilibria. For the equilibrium with bribery, the requirement (4.2)
becomes B>−∞; for the equilibrium without bribery, the requirement (4.7) becomes B<+∞.
Both are trivially satisﬁed. Thus, an equilibrium with XHU,P ∈ (0,1) exists if and only if the
conditions 0 < α <u / (2u − c) and (2.1) — (2.3) hold. These requirements are satisﬁed by a
non-empty set of parameter values. Moreover, the two equilibria coexist. Since the equilibria
depend on (β,σ) continuously, they also exist for (β,σ)s u ﬃciently close to (1,0). QED
The following example illustrates the existence of the two equilibria in a broader region.
Example 4.2. Let the parameters be given by the following: β =0 .9, σ =0 .4, θ =0 .1, u =1 ,
c =0 .5, b =3 .
With these parameter values, Figure 1 depicts the existence regions of the two equilibria in the
subspace (B,α). The assumptions (2.1) — (2.3) are satisﬁed when 0.275 <B<0.333. For any
B in this range, the equilibrium with corruption exists when αLb(B) < α < αHb(B), and the
equilibrium without corruption exists when αLn(B) < α < αHn(B). The two equilibria co-exist
when αLb(B) < α < αHn(B).
Figure 1 here.
23We emphasize that the co-existence is driven by the fact that the punishment on corruption
endogenously depends on the level of corruption. When bureaucrats do not accept bribes, they
exchange their high-quality goods only when they can see that their partners’ goods are of high
quality. Since the bureaucracy’s goods are never exchanged for lemons, the cost of replacing these
g o o d si sl o w ,a n ds ot h ep a y o ﬀ to belonging to the bureaucracy is high. This high payoﬀ deters
corruption because a bureaucrat would risk losing this high payoﬀ if he accepted a bribe and were
caught. On the other hand, if bureaucrats accept bribes, a large fraction of the bureaucracy’s
goods are exchanged for lemons and bribes. In that case, the bureaucracy’s consumption of high-
quality goods is low, and the cost of replacing goods is high. Both factors reduce the payoﬀ to
belonging to the bureaucracy and make corruption more likely.
Although our model is very stylized, casual observations suggest that corruption of government
oﬃcials is indeed less wide-spread in countries where such oﬃcials enjoy high beneﬁts (e.g., salary,
status, etc.). Conversely, corruption is widely spread in countries where such oﬃcials are treated
poorly, and the value of being in the bureaucracy (without bribes) is low.
4.4. Welfare Analysis
A private agent’s ex ante welfare is V0, which is equal to VL (or VH−c) in the two equilibria in our
discussion. A bureaucrat’s ex ante welfare is VG. The society’s welfare is W ≡ σVG +( 1− σ)V0,
which measures the expected utility of an agent before he realizes whether he is a private agent
or a bureaucrat. We examine how these welfare measures change with σ and α.T h ee ﬀects of σ
are interesting because an increase in σ, the fraction of newborns who are bureaucrats, is likely
to increase the stationary size of the bureaucracy. The eﬀects of α are interesting because an
increase in α represents an improvement in the ability to recognize quality.10 To distinguish the
two equilibria, we attach the subscript n to variables in the equilibrium without corruption and
b to variables in the equilibrium with corruption. We have the following.11
10Another parameter is the size of bribe, B. We found that welfare decreases with B in all numerical examples.
11The proof is straightforward and omitted. To determine the signs of various derivatives, notice that the
equilibria exist in the limit case (β,σ) → (1,0) only if 0 < α <u / (2u − c).
24Proposition 4.3. When (β,σ) → (1,0), (V0,V G,W) are all increasing functions of σ in both
equilibria.
In other words, all measures of welfare increase with the size of the bureaucracy when this
size is suﬃciently small. The gain to private agents comes primarily from increased frequency of
transactions for private agents who hold high-quality goods. In an economy without bureaucracy,
a private agent with a high-quality good sometimes exchanges the good for a low-quality good
from which the agent derives little utility. For every private agent that is replaced by a bureaucrat
who commits to producing only high-quality goods, the number of agents producing high-quality
goods increases by 1−P. In this case, a private agent with a high-quality good has a higher chance
than before to meet another high-quality good holder, and so his expected utility increases. This is
the case even in the equilibrium with bribery, because a private agent holding a high-quality good
does not oﬀer bribes. Thus, VH increases in both equilibria as σ increases. Because a bureaucrat
is a high-quality good producer by construction, his value function increases for a similar reason.
The value function of a low-quality good producer also increases, because VL = VH−c. Therefore,
a private agent’s ex ante welfare increases.
T os e et h ew e l f a r ee ﬀects of σ in a larger parameter region, consider the following example:
Example 4.4. β =0 .9, α =0 .4, θ =0 .1, u =1 , c =0 .5, b =3 , B =0 .322 (≡ BB).
With these parameter values, the two equilibria coexist for σ ∈ (0,0.565). Figure 2a depicts
the dependence of (V0,V G)o nσ in the two equilibria, and Figure 2b depicts the dependence of
(P,h,G)o nσ,w h e r eh is the probability with which a private agent with a high-quality good
succeeds in obtaining a high-quality good, and G is the solution for the bureaucracy size (γ)i n
the equilibrium with corruption. An increase in σ increases the size of the bureaucracy in the
two equilibria (recall that γ = σ in the equilibrium without corruption). Both the private agent’s
and the bureaucrat’s welfare levels are increasing functions of σ in the two equilibria. Thus the
society’s ex ante welfare is increasing in σ. As we discussed above, the welfare gain to a private
25agent rises because h increases with σ (see Figure 2b). Similarly, as σ increases, a private agent
is more likely to exchange a high quality good for a good of unknown quality.
It is important to supplement the above welfare eﬀect of σ with two remarks. First, the positive
welfare result of a bureaucracy should not be construed as a statement that a bureaucracy can
always improve welfare. Rather, the result serves the purpose of demonstrating that the exogenous
advantages for a bureaucracy assumed in the literature are not necessary for the bureaucracy to
improve welfare. Because our assumption that a bureaucracy can commit to producing high-
q u a l i t yg o o d si sn o ta l w a y ss a t i s ﬁed in actual economies, one should be careful when mapping
our welfare result with actual observations.
Second, one may be tempted to conclude that the positive welfare eﬀect in our model is a
simple change in the decomposition between bureaucrats and private agents, with some private
agents who produce low-quality goods being replaced by bureaucrats who produce high-quality
goods. This interpretation misses an interesting feature in Figure 2b. Namely, the increase in
the public provision of high-quality goods, caused by the increase in σ, crowds out the private
provision of high-quality goods. Not only does the size of the private sector shrink but also
private agents produce high-quality goods with a lower probability. This probability falls because
an increase in bureaucracy size beneﬁts a holder of a high-quality good more than a holder of
a low-quality good. In equilibrium agents must be indiﬀerent between producing high-quality
and low-quality goods. Therefore, to restore this mixed-strategy equilibrium, the fraction of low-
quality private agents must increase to oﬀset the excess gain to agents with high-quality goods.
Despite such crowding-out, the increase in σ increases the overall fraction of high-quality goods
in the market. That is, the crowding-out is less than one-for-one.
Figures 2a and 2b here.
We now illustrate the welfare eﬀects of reducing the informational asymmetry, as represented
by an increase in α. Consider the parameter values in Example 4.2. In addition, set B =0 .322
(≡ BB), in which case the two equilibria co-exist for α ∈ (0.257,0.501). Figure 3a depicts the
26dependence of welfare levels on α in the two equilibria, and Figure 3b depicts the dependence of
(P,h,G)o nα.
Figure 3a and 3b here.
In the equilibrium without corruption, both private agents’ and bureaucrats’ welfare increases
with α. For a private agent with a high-quality good, an increase in α increases his utility by
reducing the number of exchanges with agents holding low-quality goods. Since VL = VH −
c in the two equilibria, expected utility of agents who hold low-quality goods also increases.
For bureaucrats, an increase in α increases their expected utility by increasing the number of
exchanges with private agents who hold high-quality goods.
In the equilibrium with corruption, in contrast, an increase in α improves welfare only when α
is large. When α is small, an increase in α reduces welfare for both private agents and bureaucrats.
This negative welfare eﬀect arises because the equilibrium size of the bureaucracy shrinks with α,
as illustrated by the decreasing function G in Figure 3b. As the detection technology improves, a
larger fraction of corrupt bureaucrats is caught and expelled from the bureaucracy. This generates
a smaller bureaucracy; thus, the fraction of high-quality goods in the market can be lower. When
α is suﬃciently large, however, a further increase in α improves welfare by suﬃciently reducing
the number of low-quality goods exchanged between private agents.
The eﬀects of α on P are similar to the eﬀect of σ. That is, an increase in α beneﬁts a private
agent who holds a high-quality good more than a private agent who holds a low-quality good; to
restore the indiﬀerence between producing the two qualities, P must fall.12
5. Conclusion
We have analyzed the exchange patterns in two economies with decentralized exchanges and asym-
metric information regarding product quality. In the economy without a bureaucracy, agents do
not trade socially ineﬃcient bribes with each other. We introduced bureaucracy as a coalition
of agents who have centralized production and consumption and showed that the positive exter-
12This result is similar to the one obtained in a monetary model by Wang (2000).
27nality created by such a bureaucracy also gives rise to low power incentives for the individual
bureaucrats and might lead to corruption. We endogenized the punishment on corruption as
the loss of the beneﬁt from being part of the bureaucracy. In the economy with a bureaucracy,
there are two self-fulﬁlling equilibria. In one the bureaucrats accept bribes, and in the other they
do not. The equilibrium without corruption generates higher welfare and is able to support a
larger bureaucracy than the equilibrium with corruption. Despite the existence of corruption, a
bureaucracy may improve the welfare of the society.
Our welfare results should be interpreted with some caution. First, real world bureaucracies
have many functions other than alleviating market failures arising from private information,
although the latter is an important function emphasized in our paper as well as some other
papers on bureaucracy (e.g., Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000). Second, there are features that we
abstract from that limit the desirability of a large bureaucracy. Introducing such features will
lead to a more realistic model and might overturn some of our welfare conclusions. We consider
our welfare results to be of value to the extent that they will remain an important part of such
a more complicated story.
We believe that the search model with lemons is a rudimentary but appropriate framework
that captures the link between market failure and corruption. This framework endogenously
generates trading patterns that distinguish bribery from gifts; the former is a corrupt exchange
between a private agent and a bureaucrat, while the latter is an exchange between two private
agents. In addition, the model illustrates that corruption is not merely a transfer from private
agents to bureaucrats, but rather an exchange that incurs a social deadweight loss. There is a del-
icate trade-oﬀ between the cost of corruption and the potential social beneﬁt from a bureaucracy
that can commit to producing high-quality goods.
As we mentioned earlier, bureaucracy in existing models is typically exogenous in the sense
that, by assumption, it controls certain elements of the exchange. The bureaucracy in our model
is not fully endogenous either since we do not model explicitly how agents choose to form it,
28and how it commits to producing high-quality goods. These exogenous features notwithstanding,
our model makes a step forward by assuming that the bureaucracy does not control directly any
element of the exchange process. We hope that our analysis will provide a step forward to shifting
the focus of future research towards a fully endogenous bureaucracy. For such an analysis, we
believe that the feature of a bureaucracy that we emphasized in this paper, namely, centralized
production and consumption, will continue to be important.
Many extensions are possible. We mention two here. The ﬁrst involves allowing agents to
acquire technologies that improve the ability to recognize the quality of goods. We have already
shown that a higher ability is not necessarily welfare-improving, and so there might be a socially
desirable level of such ability. Wang (2000) has analyzed information acquisition in a search model
without corruption. It would be interesting to see whether the presence of corruption changes
his results. A second extension is to examine corruption at diﬀerent levels of a hierarchical
bureaucracy. More generally, one can examine how diﬀerent ways of organizing a bureaucracy
aﬀect corruption, a topic emphasized by Shleifer and Vishny (1993).
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A. Proof of Proposition 2.1
First, we establish the following Lemma.
Lemma A.1. A symmetric equilibrium with P>0 has the following properties: (i) XLH =
∆HL
LH = ∆HU
LH =1 ;( i i )Qa





Proof. Similar to (2.6), we express the value function VL as follows:
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Part (i) of the Lemma states that an L agent who sees the partner’s quality as H always
wants to trade. The L agent’s surplus is u + qa
LH − bQa
HL + β(V0 − VL) if the partner knows his
good’s quality and u + qa
LH − bQa
HU + β(V0 − VL) if he does not. Even under the worst terms of
trade, qa
LH =0a n dQa
Hj = B, the surpluses in the two types of matches are no less than u−bB,
which is positive under assumption (2.1). Thus, the agent always wants to trade. Part (ii) of
the Lemma states that an H holder will not trade with a partner who asks for a bribe. If the H
holder trades and oﬀers a bribe, his surplus is u + qa
Hj − bB + β(V0 − VH), where j ∈ {H,L,U}
is the agent’s perception of the quality of the partner’s good. Since qa
Hj ≤ B and V0 − VH ≤− c,
the surplus is no more than u−(b−1)B−βc, which is negative under assumption (2.2). For part
(iii), consider an agent with an H good who sees that the partner holds an L good. If he trades,
his surplus is qa
HL − bQa
Lj + β(V0 − VH), where j ∈ {H,U}.S i n c eV0 − VH ≤− c if P>0, the
s u r p l u si sn om o r et h a nB − βc<u / b− βc<0. Thus, xHL = XHL = 0, as in part (iii). With
XHL = 0, the surplus associated with the decision xLH is
(1 − α)XHUδHU
LH (u + qa
LH − bQa
HU + β(V0 − VL)).
To maximize this surplus, the choices (qa
LH,q
g
LH) must ensure δHU
LH =1 .F o rδHU











HU. This completes the proof of Lemma A.1. QED
Next, we move to the proof of Proposition 2.1. Since P =1i nat y p ea equilibrium, we can
use (2.7) to write the functional equation for VH as follows:









Agents do not request bribes in this equilibrium; i.e., Qa
HH = 0. If, to the contrary, Qa
HH = B,
then xHH =0b yL e m m aA . 1 ,a n ds oVH = 0, which violates the requirement VH − VL >c .
Similarly, XHH > 0. Given Qa
HH =0a n dQ
g
HH ≥ 0, an individual agent earns the maximum
surplus XHH(u+Q
g





HH ≥ 0. This surplus is positive, and





To complete the proof we must show that it is optimal for agents to always produce H goods.
Suppose that an agent deviates to producing an L good. With P = 1, the deviator always meets
ap a r t n e rw h oh o l d sa nH good. By Lemma A.1, he successfully trades only if the partner does
not recognize the quality of his good, and if qa
LH ≤ Q
g
HU =0a n dq
g
LH ≥ Qa
HU =0 . T h u s
qa
LH = 0. Substituting these conditions and (2.7) into the functional equation for VL yields
VL =( 1− α)(u − βc)/[(1 − βα)(1 − β)]. We have VL <V H − c if and only if α >c / u ,i nw h i c h
case the deviation is not proﬁtable. QED
B. Proof of Proposition 2.2
We establish a series of Lemmas ﬁrst.
Lemma B.1. XLL =0 .
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that XLL > 0. We proceed through the following steps.
Step 1. XLL > 0 in a symmetric equilibrium only if XLU > 0, Qa
LL = Q
g





In a symmetric equilibrium, XLL > 0i ﬀ xLL > 0. From the Bellman equation, for xLL > 0,











LL ≤ 0 in any symmetric equilibrium, the surplus is strictly positive
only if the second term is positive, which requires that XLU > 0, qa




Thus, in a symmetric equilibrium Qa
LL = Q
g
LU = B and Qa
LU = 0. Then, qa
LL − bQa
LL < 0. If
32Q
g
LL = B, the agent can increase his expected surplus by deviating to q
g
LL =0<Q a
LL,w h i c h
yields δLL
LL = 0 and neutralizes the potential loss. This cannot be an equilibrium, and so Q
g
LL =0 .
Step 2. If XLL > 0, Qa
LL = Q
g
LU = B and Q
g
LL = Qa
LU =0 ,a si nS t e p1 ,t h e nXLU > 0o n l y
if XHU > 0, Q
g
HU =0a n dQa
HU = B.
Let us examine the decision on xLU. Recalling that XHL = 0, the expected surplus associated
with the decision xLU is
P(1 − α)XHUδHU




















LU = 1, and the above surplus becomes
P(1 − α)XHU(u − bQa
HU) − (1 − P)αXLLbB.
For xLU > 0, the surplus must be non-negative, which requires that XHU > 0. If Q
g
HU = B,
the surplus in (B.1) can be increased by choosing qa
LU = B rather than qa
LU = Qa
LU =0 :t h e
choice qa
LU = B (>Q a
LL) neutralizes the loss qa
LU −bQa
LL by inducing δLL
LU = 0, while maintaining
δHU
LU = 1. Similarly, if Qa
HU =0 ,b yc h o o s i n gq
g
LU =0( <Q a





the agent can neutralize the loss qa
LU − bQa
LL without aﬀecting other possible trades. Thus, for
xLU > 0, we must have Q
g
HU =0a n dQa
HU = B.









HU =0 ,a si n
Step 2, then XHU > 0o n l yi fXHH > 0, Qa





HU = 0, Lemma A.1 implies that Qa
LH =0 . W i t hQa
LH = Qa
HU = B and Qa
LU =0 ,
the expected surplus associated with the choice xHU is
PαXHHδHH
HU (u + qa
HU − bQa
HH − βc)+P(1 − α)XHUδHU
HU(u + qa










Under (2.1) and (2.2), the term multiplied by (1 − P) is negative, and so is the term u + qa
HU −




HU)=( 0 ,B). For this we need XHH > 0a n dδHH
HU =1 .F o rδHH
HU =1 ,
in turn, we need Qa
HH ≤ q
g
HU =0a n dQ
g
HH ≥ qa
HU = B.T h u s ,Qa
HH =0a n dQ
g
HH = B.
Step 4. If XHH > 0, XHU > 0, Qa
HU = B,a n d( Q
g
HH,Q a
HH)=( B,0), as in Step 3, there is a




HH =0a n dQa
HU = B, the expected surplus associated with the choice of xHH is
αXHHδHH
HH(u + qa
HH − βc)+( 1− α)XHUδHU
HH(u + qa
HH − bB − βc).
33Note that XHU(u + qa
HH − bB − βc) < 0, for any qa
HH ≥ 0. Since Qa
HU = B, this potential loss
can be neutralized by deviating to q
g
HH = 0, which induces δHU
HH = 0. This deviation does not
change the ﬁrst term of the above surplus. Thus, the deviation is proﬁtable.
Therefore, there cannot be any symmetric equilibrium with XLL > 0. QED
Lemma B.2. (i) XHU =0implies XLU =0and VL =0 ;( i i )XHU > 0 implies XHH > 0.
Proof.I fXHU = 0, the expected surplus associated with the choice of xLU is






LU is negative for an exchange with Qa
LU > 0, the best the two agents in such
a match can achieve is to swap the L-quality goods and exchange no services. This yields zero
surplus. By our tie-breaking rule, there is no exchange. Thus, xLU = XLU =0 . W i t hXLU =
XHU =0 ,i ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a tVL =0 . T op r o v et h a tXHU > 0i m p l i e sXHH > 0, suppose
XHU > 0. The expected surplus associated with the choice xHU is
PαXHHδHH
HU (u + qa
HU − bQa





















The inequality follows from the fact that the term multiplied by 1 − P is non-positive under







HH)t ob ee q u a lt ot h o s e( qa
HU,q
g
HU), the surplus associated with the
decision xHH is non-negative, and so xHH > 0. QED












LU =0 , XLU =1 , ∆HU
LU = ∆LU
LU =1 .
Proof. For part (i), suppose ﬁrst, to the contrary, that Qa
HH = B. As shown in the proof of








Since XHH > 0w h e nXHU > 0, with Qa
HH = B,t h eﬁrst term is non-positive and is strictly
negative if δHH
HU =1 . F o rXHU > 0, the second term must be non-negative, and this can
be achieved in a symmetric equilibrium only if qa
HU = Qa





HU = 0. This is because u + qa
HU − bQa
HH − βc<0w h e nqa




HU = B;ad e v i a t i o nt oq
g
HU = 0 induces δHH
HU = 0 and neutralizes this potential loss




HU =0a n dQa
HH = B,w eh a v eδHU
HH = 0, in which case the expected surplus associated
with the decision xHH is
αXHHδHH
HH(u + qa
HH − bB − βc) < 0.
This induces xHH = 0, contradicting the result XHH > 0. Thus, Qa
HH =0 . S e tQa
HH =0
and suppose, contrary to the Lemma, that Qa




HH − βc)+( 1− α)XHUδHU
HH(u + qa
HH − bB − βc).
This surplus is maximized by setting qa
HH = Q
g
HH.S i n c e qa
HH = Qa
HH = 0 in any symmetric
equilibrium, Q
g
HH =0 .W i t hQa
HU = B and XHU > 0, the expected surplus associated with the
decision xHU is strictly less than
PαXHHδHH
HU (u + qa
HU − βc).
For xHU > 0, the terms (qa
HU,q
g
HU) must ensure δHH




This is not possible in a symmetric equilibrium with Qa
HU = B. Therefore, Qa
HU =0 . W i t h
Qa
HH = Qa
HU =0 ,a nH agent who does not know the quality of the partner’s good will secure the
trade with the partner with an H good no matter whether he chooses q
g
HU =0o rB, provided that
qa
HU =0 .I fQ
g
HU = B, however, Lemma A.1 implies that Qa
LH = Q
g
HU = B, and the choice q
g
HU =




in the surplus associated with the choice xHU is negative if q
g
HU = B and can be reduced to zero
if q
g
HU = 0. The deviation does not reduce the surpluses in other types of trade that the HU
agent might have. This shows that Q
g
HU = 0 in all symmetric equilibria, which implies Qa
LH =0
by Lemma A.1. Given that part (i) of the Lemma holds, the corresponding quantities of trade
imply that δHH
HH = δHU
HH = 1. The expected surplus associated with the decision xHH is strictly
positive, and so XHH = 1. Similarly, δHH
HU = δHU
HU =1 .
We now prove part (iii). Since XHL = XLL =0 ,a n dQa
HU = 0, the expected surplus
associated with the decision xLU is
P(1 − α)XHUδHU
LU (u + qa




Consider the choices qa
LU =0a n dq
g
LU =0 . S i n c e( Qa
HU,Q
g








HU.T h u s ,δHU
LU =1 ,a n dt h eﬁrst term of the surplus is strictly positive.
35If Qa
LU = B,t h ec h o i c eq
g
LU = 0 induces δLU
LU = 0 and neutralizes the second term of the surplus;
if Qa
LU = 0, then the choice q
g
LU =0g e n e r a t e sqa
LU − bQa
LU = 0. In both cases, the expected
surplus is strictly positive, and so xLU = 1. This argument also shows that qa
LU = Qa
LU = B
cannot be an equilibrium: if Qa
LU = B, following the strategy qa
LU = Qa
LU = B would generate at
most zero surplus, which can be improved by setting qa
LU =0 .W i t hQa
LU =0a n dQa
HU =0 ,i t
is immediately clear that δHU
LU = δLU
LU =1 . Q E D
Now we complete the proof of Proposition 2.2. The above Lemmas have established the
trading patterns described in the Proposition. In particular, there is no bribe exchange in any
equilibrium. With these trading patterns, we can simplify the value functions as (2.8). Then the
requirement 0 <P<1, which is equivalent to VH − c = VL, becomes
(1 − β)c = P[α +( 1− α)XHU]2(u − βc) − (1 − α)XHU[Pu+( 1− P)βc]. (B.2)
Also, the equilibrium requirement XHU > 0 becomes
P[α +( 1− α)XHU](u − βc) ≥ (1 − P)βc. (B.3)
If this condition holds with strict inequality, then XHU = 1; if this condition holds with equality,
then XHU ∈ (0,1). For the type b equilibrium, set XHU =1i n( B . 2 )t os o l v ef o rP. Then, verify
the equilibrium requirements that (B.3) holds with strict inequality, and that 0 <P<1. These
requirements are equivalent to c/u < α < α2.F o rt h et y p ec equilibrium, set (B.3) as equality,
and solve this equation jointly with (B.2) for (P,XHU). Imposing the equilibrium requirements
0 <P<1a n d0<X HU < 1 yields α3 < α < α2. (In fact, the requirement 0 <X HU < 1i m p l i e s
0 <P<1i nt h i sc a s e . ) Q E D
C .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . 1
Suppose that αR>B . We follow the following steps.
Step 1. XLG =1a n dYGL =0 .I fYGU = 0, then no bribes are exchanged in equilibrium.
Since bB < u,t h es u r p l u st oa nL agent from the exchange with a bureaucrat is positive, no
matter whether the bureaucrat recognizes the L quality. Thus, XLG =1 . S i n c eαR>B ,t h e
surplus to the bureaucrat in such a match is negative if he recognizes quality. Thus yGL =0 .
Suppose YGU =0 . I fe i t h e rYGH =0o rXHG = 0, then there is no exchange between private
agents and the bureaucracy, in which case the Lemma is trivially true. Thus, let us suppose
YGH > 0a n dXHG > 0. For yGH > 0, we need Qa
HG = 0; otherwise qa
GH − bQa
HG < 0, and so
yGH = 0. Similarly, for xHG > 0, we need Qa
GH =0 . S i n c eQa
HG and Qa
GH are both zero, no
bribes are exchanged.
36Step 2. YGU > 0i m p l i e sQa
HG =0a n dYGH =1 .












The inequality follows from the fact that qa
GU − bQa
LG − αR ≤ B − αR<0. Thus, for yGU > 0,
it is necessary that XHG > 0a n dqa
GU − bQa
HG ≥ 0f o rs u c h( qa
GU,q
g







HG. This is impossible if Qa
HG = B.L e tQa




feasible for the choices (qa
GH,q
g
GH), which yield a non-negative expected surplus for the choice
yGH.T h u s ,yGH =1 .
Step 3. If YGU > 0, then Qa
LG = Q
g












GU = 0, this demand can be met by the private agent, yielding
δLG
GU = 1. In this case, the surplus associated with the choice yGU is strictly negative, contradicting
the supposition YGU > 0. Thus, qa
GU = Qa
GU = B in equilibrium, which implies Q
g
LG = B.I f
Q
g
GU = B,t h e nQa
LG = qa
LG = B from the decision on qa
LG. Again, this generates δLG
GU =1a n da
loss to the bureaucrat in an exchange with an L agent. By deviating to q
g
GU =0( <Q a
LG = B),
the bureaucrat can induce δLG
GU = 0 and neutralize this loss. The deviation does not reduce the
chance for the bureaucrat to exchange with an H agent since Qa
HG =0a ss h o w ni nS t e p2 .
Therefore, in equilibrium it must be true that Q
g
GU = 0, which induces Qa
LG =0 .
Step 4. If YGU > 0, then Qa
GH = Q
g
HG = 0, which yields a contradiction.
With YGU > 0, we have Qa
GU = B, as shown in Step 3, and so u+qa
HG−bQa
GU −βc<0. The




Since YGH =1w h e nYGU > 0, the above surplus is strictly negative if Qa
GH = B.T h i s w o u l d
imply xHG = 0, which has been shown above to be inconsistent with trade between the private
sector and the bureaucracy. Thus, Qa
GH = 0. Next, notice that when Qa
GH =0 ,t h eb e s tc h o i c e
of q
g
HG for a private agent holding an H good in a match with a bureaucrat is q
g
HG =0 .T h i si s
because the private agent in such a match gets a positive surplus from trade when the government




keeps the possible gain and neutralizes the possible loss. In contrast, the choice q
g
HG = B invites
trade in both cases and reduces the expected surplus. Now that Q
g
HG =0<q a
GU,t h es u r p l u s
associated with the decision yGU is strictly negative, contradicting the supposition YGU > 0. This
completes the proof of the Lemma. QED
37D .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . 2
Consider a bureaucrat’s decision on yGL.G i v e nQ
g
LG = B and Qa
LG = 0, the surplus associated
with yGL is XLGδLG
GLqa
GL,w h e r eδLG
GL =1i ﬀ qa
GL ≤ Q
g
LG = B and q
g
GL ≥ Qa
LG =0 . B yc h o o s i n g
the supposed equilibrium quantity qa
GL = Qa
GL = B, the bureaucrat obtains a surplus XLGB;i fh e
deviates to qa
GL =0 ,t h es u r p l u si s0 .S i n c eXLG = 1, there is no incentive for the bureaucrat to
deviate from the equilibrium choices qa





GL = 0 is not dominated by other choices (although q
g
GL = B yields the same surplus).
Similarly, consider a bureaucrat’s decision on yGU.S i n c eQa
HG = Qa





GU.A l s o , qa
GU ≤ B = Q
g
LG.T h u s δLG
GU =1f o ra n yc h o i c eqa
GU,q
g
GU ∈ {0,B}.N o t i n g
that XLG = 1, as supposed in the equilibrium, the surplus associated with the choice yGU is
PXHGδHG
GU qa
GU +( 1− P)qa
GU. This is 0 if the bureaucrat chooses to deviate to qa
GU =0 . I ft h e
bureaucrat adheres to the supposed equilibrium strategy qa
GU = Qa
GU = B,t h es u r p l u si sa tl e a s t
(1−P)B>0. Thus, qa
GU = B and so yGU = 1, as in the supposed equilibrium. Like the quantity
q
g
GL, the decision q
g
GU = 0 is consistent with the bureaucrat’s incentive, but q
g
GU = B yields the
same surplus. Next, consider a private agent’s decision on xLG.W i t hYGL = YGU =1a n dt h e
quantities (Qa
GL,Q a
GU)=( B,B), the surplus associated with xLG is
αδGL
LG(u + qa







GU =0a n dQa
GL = Qa
GU = B, the above surplus is zero if either qa
LG = B or
q
g
LG = 0. In contrast, if qa
LG =0a n dq
g
LG = B as described in equilibrium, then δGL
LG = δGU
LG =1 ,
and the surplus is u−bB > 0. Thus, qa
LG =0 ,q
g
LG = B,a n dxLG = 1. Finally, consider a meeting




clearly the choices qa
GH = q
g
GH = 0 maximize the bureaucrat’s surplus associated with yGH and










HG =0y i e l dδGH
HG =1 ,δGU
HG = 0, and a surplus α(u − βc) > 0 for the private agent
associated with the choice xHG.Ad e v i a t i o nt oqa
HG = B reduces the surplus to 0. A deviation
to q
g
HG = B induces δGU
HG = 1 and reduces the surplus to
α(u − βc)+( 1− α)(u − (b − 1)B − βc) < α(u − βc),
where the inequality follows from (2.2). Thus, the optimal choices for the private agent in such
a meeting are qa
HG = q
g














The equilibrium with bribery exists if αLb(B) < α < αHb(B),
The equilibrium without bribery exists if αLn(B) < α < αHn(B).
Figure 1. Co-existence of equilibria
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Figure 2a Dependence of welfare on σ
σ: fraction of newborns who are bureaucrats; BB:aﬁxed size of bribe;
V0: private agent’s value function; VG: bureaucrat’s value function;
b (n): subscript for the equilibrium with bribery (without bribery);
P: prob. for a private agent to produce high-quality goods; h:p r o b .
for a private agent holding a high-quality good to get a high-quality
good in exchange; G: stationary size of the bureaucracy.
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Figure 2b Dependence of P and h on σ
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Figure 3a Dependence of welfare on α
α: prob. of recognizing a good’s quality; BB:aﬁxed size of bribe;
V0: private agent’s value function; VG: bureaucrat’s value function;
b (n): subscript for the equilibrium with bribery (without bribery);
P: prob. for a private agent to produce high-quality goods; h:p r o b .
for a private agent holding a high-quality good to get a high-quality
good in exchange; G: stationary size of the bureaucracy.
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Figure 3b Dependence of P and h on α
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